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SACRIFICING QUANTITY FOR QUALITY: BETTER
FOCUSING PROSECUTORS’ SCARCE
RESOURCES
Stephanos Bibas*
Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger rightly explore an important
problem that prosecutors face: they are spread too thin trying to prosecute
too many cases. Their thoughtful, well-written article is an important
contribution to the field and usefully complements the burgeoning literature
on the underfunding of criminal defense. As they argue, prosecutorial
overwork harms justice in any number of ways. It delays cases, frustrates
victims, makes it harder to spot and free innocent defendants, and impedes
lowering punishments for sympathetic defendants.1
The root problem, however, is not so much a matter of underfunding of
prosecutors’ offices as it is a matter of skewed priorities and metrics of
success. Prosecutors need not pursue every legally supportable charge.
They enjoy discretion in deciding which cases to pursue, which charges to
file, and which pleas to offer and accept. Though they have that
discretionary power, too often they do not think strategically about using it.
Indeed, individual prosecutors often reactively prosecute the cases that
come before them, instead of proactively setting priorities and focusing on
system-wide tradeoffs. Many offices lack hierarchies or office policies that
meaningfully direct line prosecutors’ efforts. The problem, evinced by the
framing of Gershowitz and Killinger’s article, is that prosecutors and the
public measure prosecutorial success mostly in terms of the number of
cases filed and convictions won. Throwing money at this problem would
only pour fuel on the fire, encouraging prosecutors to widen their nets in the
inexhaustible sea of potential cases.
A surer solution is to refocus prosecutors’ efforts to make the best use
of inevitably limited money. For instance, as Gershowitz and Killinger
rightly point out, prosecutors pay too little attention to victims and
communities, failing to solicit their input and take them seriously.2 We
must move from worshipping quantity to prizing quality. Prosecutors need
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to focus not just on what to do but also how to do it: fairly, respectfully, and
effectively.
America’s criminal-justice politics are indeed pathological, as the late
Bill Stuntz famously argued.3 Legislatures collude with prosecutors to
create new, broad, and overlapping crimes, which gives prosecutors a menu
of charging options for a wide array of old and new offenses. Thus,
expansive criminal-justice legislation leads to the familiar complaint of
overcriminalization.
In a world of overcriminalization, limited budgets are not all bad. The
silver lining is that prosecutors cannot possibly pursue all of the new crimes
that their legislative allies have created. Resource constraints and scarcity
can force prosecutors to rank priorities, mitigating in practice the problem
of overcriminalization on the books. Limited funds thus are not a bug but a
design feature: they check prosecutors from prosecuting the entire universe
of people who are technically guilty of something but do not especially
deserve conviction and full punishment. The value of pursuing crimes is a
declining curve, and at some point the costs of extra enforcement will
exceed the benefits. One cannot know a priori what the optimal level of
funding is—that requires much finer-grained data about what crimes
prosecutors would pursue if given more money. It seems plausible that
budgets are too tight in many places. But the optimal funding level is much
less than would be required to try every single alleged crime. That is
particularly true because an extra dollar spent on criminal justice is a dollar
less for other programs. At some point, criminal justice’s bottomless
appetite must give way to other needs.
More generally, overall percentages and statistics alone do not tell the
full story. Gershowitz and Killinger repeatedly mention violent crimes,
correctly implying that some kinds of cases count more than others.4 But
statistics, even Gershowitz and Killinger’s own statistics, often lump cases
together.5 Prosecutors rightly feel pressure to prosecute most of the crimes
listed on the FBI’s index (murder, rape, robbery, burglary, arson,
aggravated assault, larceny, and auto theft). But they also pursue a wide
range of narcotics cases that cause varying degrees of harm. Street-corner
and crack-house drug sales, for example, often blight neighborhoods with
violence and signs of decay, as do the smuggling and distribution that
precede them. In contrast, discreet sales may have fewer harmful effects.
One could draw the same contrast between street-corner prostitution and
internet escort services. Yet prosecution and conviction statistics mask
whether we are using our drug-enforcement dollars wisely, as we would by
focusing primarily on the former cases but not the latter. Community input,
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and not arrest statistics alone, ought to shape these decisions. Similarly, we
would not want to live in a police state that inexorably enforced every law
against speeding, jaywalking, littering, false statements, and the like.
Even for crimes that manifestly should be prosecuted, much more
matters than the mere fact of prosecution. Gershowitz and Killinger rightly
point out that underfunding not only leads to delays and overcrowding, but
also impedes sorting the worst defendants for the worst punishment, turning
over exculpatory evidence, and working with victims.6 Again, all of these
costs are hidden by quantitative metrics of success. Gershowitz and
Killinger begin the process of bringing them to light, but we need a much
better empirical handle on the severity of these problems.
The difficulty seems to be a variation on the old joke about the drunk
who dropped his keys by the front door but looked for them over by the
lamppost because that is where the light was the best. Prosecutors and
voters focus on a handful of quantifiable, objective metrics, such as the
number of prosecutions and convictions, and imagine each of these cases as
some hypothetical violent or serious crime. As Josh Bowers’s response
points out, however, the more typical and numerous cases are low-level
misdemeanors, such as quality-of-life offenses.7 Now, prosecutors cannot
simply stop prosecuting all misdemeanors; these charges help to keep our
neighborhoods safe, orderly, and clean. But neither do they need to
prosecute each one to the hilt simply because there is enough evidence to do
so. The charge may be easy to file and the conviction easy to obtain, yet
prosecutors can lighten their own workloads by proactively differentiating
within this category of cases. Is the offender a known recidivist? Is there a
better way to stop the public drunkenness, urination, or littering—say, by
trying Alcoholics Anonymous before jail? Or, conversely, was this
offender behaving in a violent or belligerent manner, such that tougherthan-usual treatment is fitting?
Gershowitz and Killinger’s article is written from the perspective of
the overburdened line prosecutor who is up to his eyeballs in cases. But
scholars should broaden their field of vision to take in a synoptic
perspective. First, supervisory prosecutors matter a great deal, even though
Gershowitz and Killinger discount their importance because they do not
carry large caseloads of their own. Supervisors are in the best position to
compare office priorities and workloads and to adjust intake, screening,
deferral, diversion, and dismissal policies to ease workloads. As Ronald
Wright and Marc Miller have shown, by carefully screening out weak cases
at intake, supervisors can reduce the pressure to plea bargain at all costs.8
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Prosecutorial screening also forces police to prepare by doing better upfront investigation and sorting of cases before bringing them, which should
disproportionately protect possibly innocent defendants facing weak
evidence.
Second, supervisors should calibrate their policies and priorities to the
views of their office’s constituencies: namely, the local residents who elect
district attorneys and need to cooperate with their offices. The communityprosecution movement promised to do this, but it has largely failed to
deliver the goods. Neighborhood residents can help police and prosecutors
focus on crimes that cause substantial harm and sow fear, in addition to
identifying the range of productive responses to them. The media can better
publicize the kinds of crimes prosecutors are targeting and the alternative
programs, such as deferred prosecution, diversion for drug treatment, and
restitution, that are available for less serious offenses.
Third, Gershowitz and Killinger are absolutely right to lament how
excessive caseloads harm victims by speeding up individual cases without
keeping them abreast and letting them speak their piece.9 As I argue
elsewhere, victims ought to be much more central to criminal justice, as
they are most directly injured and thus have concrete stakes in both
substantive outcomes and procedures. Having been demeaned by crimes,
victims deserve more empowerment in criminal justice, which includes
plenty of notice and opportunities to voice their views.10 Victims do not
automatically demand the heaviest sentences, and if the system treats them
respectfully, they may gladly agree to alternative dispositions for more
minor crimes, instead of traditional prosecutions to the hilt. Victim input
can also help prosecutors see the specific injuries inflicted and dangers
posed by each defendant. This will discourage prosecutors from lumping
all defendants together. Some defendants need to have the book thrown at
them, and victims can help prosecutors figure out which deserve more
attention and more punishment.
Unfortunately, simply throwing money at prosecutors’ offices would
not effect these changes. It would instead encourage prosecutors to do
more of the same, as long as they continue to view their main job as
maximizing case processing. Line prosecutors would proceed on auto-pilot,
prosecuting larger quantities of cases without doing much more to include
victims and community input. Instead of trying to squeeze drops of
efficiency out of the system—doing more with less—we need to rethink
what we are doing and why. Our criminal justice system has become a
plea-bargaining assembly line, and more money will simply speed up the
machinery. Conversely, the current financial crisis is an opportunity to
rethink whether we want to keep paying for ever-longer sentences for evermore people, or how well we can differentiate scary, dangerous, violent
9
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felons from the many lower-level offenders. Indeed, we cannot say a priori
that more prosecution is better prosecution. Prosecutors should measure
their success not just in numbers of prosecutions and convictions, but in
victims’ and communities’ satisfaction and feelings of safety. Those
constituencies may rightly demand some quality-of-life enforcement, but
they can help prosecutors balance the benefits of enforcement against the
substantial costs of prosecution and imprisonment. Victims may also be
satisfied with face-to-face conferences, restitution, and apologies for more
minor offenses, freeing prosecutors to spend time on more serious cases.
There are many ways to include victims and communities in
prosecution. Face-to-face meetings, as well as eBay-style reputational
feedback surveys of victims and communities, can appraise past
performance and encourage prosecutors to ensure satisfaction in the future.
Line prosecutors could learn how to improve their own performance.
Supervisory prosecutors could use feedback as part of performance
evaluations in awarding raises and promotions, counteracting the beancounting tendency to focus solely on convictions and docket size. And the
media, as well as challengers to incumbent district attorneys, could do a
better job of making these measures of satisfaction issues in electoral
campaigns.11
Although my proposed solutions differ greatly from those offered by
Gershowitz and Killinger, they address the same problem. Their article is a
welcome reminder that criminal justice is about justice, more broadly
conceived, and in many ways our system slights justice as it speeds cases
along its assembly line. Speed kills, or at least it deadens us to the price we
pay and what is going on along the way. I applaud their contribution to this
conversation and hope that policymakers will notice and respond.
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